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Screening for Solidarity 
Stephen Lee† 
INTRODUCTION 
A central part of the unauthorized migration story has been 
about work. Eight million workers in the United States are un-
authorized,1 which is nearly three-fourths of the unauthorized 
migrant population and about 5 percent of the total workforce.2 
But at the heart of this story is a tension: While immigration 
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 1 The immigration code prevents employers from hiring any “unauthorized al-
ien[s],” which means that at the time of hiring, the noncitizen is not “either (A) an alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this Act or by 
the Attorney General.” Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) § 101(a)(1), Pub 
L No 99-603, 100 Stat 3359, 3360, 3368, amending INA § 274A(a)(1), (h)(3), codified at  
8 USC § 1324a(a)(1), (h)(3).  
 2 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National 
and State Trends, 2010 1 (Pew Hispanic Center Feb 1, 2011), online at http://www 
.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013) (noting that in 2010, eight mil-
lion of the approximately eleven million unauthorized migrants were in the workforce). 
Unauthorized workers comprise approximately 5.2 percent of the total workforce. Id at 
17 table 6 (showing unauthorized immigrants’ share of the US labor force for every year 
since 2000). Unauthorized migrants comprise a higher percentage of total workers in 
certain industries. See Andorra Bruno, Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Per-
formance Measures 2 table 1 (Congressional Research Service May 10, 2012), online at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R40002.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013) (noting that in 2008 
unauthorized workers comprised about 14 percent, 13 percent, and 10 percent of the 
“Construction,” “Agriculture,” and “Leisure & Hospitality” industries respectively). Un-
authorized migrants will likely continue to comprise a significant percentage of the total 
unauthorized population. The unauthorized population has remained steady for several 
years at around eleven million—just under 30 percent of the total foreign-born popula-
tion—despite the fact that immigration law has become harsher and less forgiving. See 
Passel and Cohn, National and State Trends, 2010 at 1 (cited in note 2) (graphing the 
unauthorized immigrant population from 2000 to 2010); id at 9 (“Unauthorized immi-
grants represented 28% of the nation’s foreign-born population of 40.2 million in March 
2010, according to the Pew Hispanic Center estimates. The share is the same as it was in 
2009 but a decline from 2007’s 31%.”).  
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law expressly prohibits employers from hiring unauthorized mi-
grants,3 many of our nation’s workplace laws cover workers irre-
spective of immigration status,4 which means that an unauthor-
ized migrant might obtain remedies for harms incurred in the 
course of work she was not entitled to undertake in the first 
place.5 In recent years, the executive has ramped up its efforts to 
facilitate this process. Through a series of guidance documents, 
memoranda, and public announcements, the executive (especial-
ly under President Barack Obama) has redesigned immigration 
enforcement to allow the assertion of labor rights to slow, and in 
some cases, to halt altogether the removal process. In other 
words, the executive grants varying degrees of membership ben-
efits to otherwise removable migrants who possess nonfrivolous 
workplace-related claims. 
Why do this? The standard response—the one adopted by 
many federal courts and several members of the Supreme 
Court6—is that doing so deters unauthorized migration over the 
long term. In the simplest of terms, robust labor enforcement 
raises the costs associated with hiring unauthorized migrants, 
discourages employers from hiring such workers, and causes un-
employed unauthorized migrants to self-deport.7 But this answer 
is out of touch. Despite the increased allocation of resources to 
worksite enforcement, there have not been significant changes 
to the unauthorized population during the Obama administra-
tion.8 Indeed, it is hard to imagine any administration harness-
ing worksite enforcement policy to effectively deter unauthorized 
migration, given the complex enforcement realities within which 
the executive must operate and the steep economic and human 
costs associated with crossing the border. 
Nevertheless, this Article defends the executive’s use of 
workplace claims to sort migrants in the removal pipeline, but 
 
 3 See IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat at 3360, amending INA § 274A(a)(1), codified as 
amended at 8 USC § 1324a(a)(1).  
 4 See, for example, 29 USC § 152(3). See also Sure-Tan, Inc v NLRB, 467 US 883, 
891–92 (1984). 
 5 See, for example, Agri Processor Co v NLRB, 514 F3d 1, 3–9 (DC Cir 2008); 
Singh v Jutla, 214 F Supp 2d 1056, 1061–62 (ND Cal 2002). 
 6 See, for example, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v NLRB, 535 US 137, 155–56 
(2001) (Breyer dissenting); Patel v Quality Inn South, 846 F2d 700, 704–05 (11th Cir 
1988); Singh, 214 F Supp 2d at 1062. 
 7 See, for example, Hoffman, 535 US at 155–56 (Breyer dissenting). 
 8 See Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker, Estimates of the Unauthor-
ized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011 1 (Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) Mar 2012), online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
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does so on an alternative basis. I argue that focusing on those 
migrants with workplace claims allows immigration officials to 
identify those unauthorized workers who have developed eco-
nomic and social bonds with US and otherwise authorized work-
ers. Because many of the laws regulating the workplace are sit-
uated within a vision of collective rights, the assertion of a 
workplace claim often follows from a worker’s commitment to 
the principle of solidarity—a willingness to forego short-term in-
dividual gain in the interests of realizing long-term collective 
gain. The acts of solidarity signal a commitment to the values of 
mutuality, reciprocity, and community, which increases the like-
lihood that a migrant will successfully integrate into society 
while posing minimal costs to the public. In other words, using 
workplace claims to draw distinctions among otherwise remova-
ble immigrants advances a de facto member-selection process 
where potential members are identified based on their social 
and economic bonds with citizen coworkers.  
Part I summarizes the recent changes in workplace en-
forcement, with a particular focus on the different regulatory 
innovations reconciling conflicts between labor enforcement 
goals and immigration enforcement goals in labor’s favor. This 
sets up Part II, where I develop my core claim that allocating 
immigration benefits to migrants who are willing to stand in sol-
idarity with citizen workers serves a member-selection purpose. 
Part III considers some design questions that policymakers 
might consider in refining immigration enforcement policy for 
the purposes of screening for solidarity. I then conclude.  
I.  PROTECTING WORKERS THROUGH WORKPLACE ENFORCEMENT 
At the heart of workplace enforcement is a tension. Immi-
gration law excludes unauthorized migrants from the formal 
workforce.9 At the same time, great swaths of labor and em-
ployment law protect unauthorized workers against a variety of 
harms including wage theft, unsafe working conditions, em-
ployment discrimination, and retaliation for asserting these le-
gal rights.10 These different statutory schemes thus create the 
 
 9 See IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat at 3361–62, amending INA § 274A(b), codified at 
8 USC § 1324a(b).  
 10 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) §§ 6–7, Pub L No 75-718, ch 676, 52 
Stat 1060, 1062–64, codified at 29 USC §§ 206–07 (prohibiting wage theft); Occupational  
Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 5, Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590, 1593, codified at 29 
USC § 654 (requiring safe working conditions); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, Pub L No 
88-352, 78 Stat 241, 255–57, codified at 42 USC § 2000e-2 (forbidding employment dis-
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possibility of a counterintuitive result: unauthorized migrants 
may hold bad-actor employers liable for harms incurred during 
the course of work they were not authorized to undertake in the 
first place. The primary justification has been that allowing la-
bor law to displace immigration law protects the interests of cit-
izens and otherwise authorized workers by deterring unauthor-
ized migration over the long term.  
The Obama administration has unfurled a number of work-
place enforcement policies designed to harmonize labor and im-
migration enforcement goals to help facilitate this process. More 
than past administrations, the Obama administration has prior-
itized targeting employers who knowingly recruit and hire un-
authorized workers. For example, in 2012, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) reported serving more than three 
thousand notices of inspections, which resulted in nearly $12.5 
million in fines.11 By contrast, ICE issued only eighteen final or-
ders in 2008, resulting in $675,000 in fines,12 and only three no-
tices of intent to fine in 2004.13 Beyond the use of fines and other 
civil penalties, the Obama administration has demonstrated a 
willingness to prosecute bad-actor employers for criminal viola-
tions. Although the bulk of criminal convictions in federal court 
continues to be secured against noncitizens for border crossing–
related violations,14 the number of convictions against employers 
 
crimination); FLSA § 15(a)(3), 52 Stat at 1068, codified at 29 USC § 215(a)(3). State labor 
agencies can be even more rights protective. See Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? 
The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims Making, 35 L & Soc Inq 
561, 562 (2010).  
 11 Fact Sheet: Worksite Enforcement (ICE May 23, 2012), online at http://www.ice.gov/ 
news/library/factsheets/worksite.htm (visited Mar 4, 2013).  
 12 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Priorities and the Rule of Law, Hear-
ing before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, 112th Cong, 1st 
Sess 10, 17 (2011) (statement of John Morton, Director, ICE) (“Priorities and the Rule of 
Law Hearing”). 
 13 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses 
Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-05-813, 35 
(Aug 2005), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05813.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013) 
(showing the number of notices of intent to fine from 1999 to 2004 where a notice of in-
tent precedes a final order).  
 14  For example, in August 2012, the top lead charge recorded in immigration-
related convictions in federal court is for “[r]eentry of deported alien.” See Immigration 
Convictions for August 2012 table 2 (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
(TRAC) Nov 19, 2012), online at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/ 
monthlyaug12/gui (visited Mar 4, 2013). By comparison, convictions reflecting a lead 
charge of “[u]nlawful employment of aliens” come in as the ninth most frequent lead 
charge. Id.  
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for immigration-related hiring decisions has been rising,15 and 
the executive has consistently made examples of employers who 
engage in egregious immigration-related violations.16 This policy 
draws a distinction between those employers who hire unauthor-
ized workers by mistake (for whom some kind of regulatory fix 
may be appropriate)17 and those who do so as a matter of design 
(for whom the castigating hand of criminal law might be neces-
sary to deter repetition).18 
The executive has also employed a variety of other adminis-
trative mechanisms harnessing labor law to punish employers 
who ignore immigration law’s prohibition against hiring  
unauthorized workers. Using an array of regulatory tools, immi-
 
 15 See Immigration Convictions for August 2012: Lead Charge: 08 USC 1324a—
Unlawful Employment of Aliens (TRAC Dec 14, 2012), online at http://tracfed.syr.edu/ 
results/9x2050cb6cf565.html (visited Mar 4, 2013) (reporting that convictions reflecting a 
lead charge for “unlawful employment of aliens” have increased by 60 percent from levels 
reported in 2007, which pre-dates the Obama administration). 
 16  See Arkansas Businessman Sentenced for Multi-state Illegal Alien Hiring 
Scheme (ICE Sept 26, 2012), online at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1209/ 
120926fayetteville.htm (visited Mar 4, 2013) (reporting that a business owner was sen-
tenced to thirty months for providing fraudulent documents to and hiring unauthorized 
migrants); Owners of Bay Area Restaurant Chain Sentenced for Tax Violations, Hiring 
Illegal Aliens; Defendants Ordered to Pay More Than $2 Million in Restitution to IRS 
(ICE Apr 24, 2012), online at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1204/120424oakland.htm 
(visited Mar 4, 2013) (reporting that husband and wife business owners were sentenced 
for various immigration, social security, and tax violations, with the husband receiving 
forty-one months in prison). See also Julia Preston, A Crackdown on Employing Illegal 
Workers, NY Times A1 (May 30, 2011). 
 17  For example, although DHS cannot compel private employers to verify the im-
migration status of their workers through its database, it strongly encourages employers 
to voluntarily do so through programs such as ICE Mutual Agreement between Govern-
ment and Employers (IMAGE). E-Verify (ICE Nov 29, 2012), online at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
e-verify (visited Mar 4, 2013) (reporting that verifying an employee’s immigration status 
with the DHS E-Verify database is voluntary for most employers); IMAGE (ICE), online 
at http://www.ice.gov/image (visited Mar 4, 2013). In exchange for voluntarily submitting 
to this database-driven form of regulation, immigration officials offer cost-saving 
measures for employers, like refraining from I-9 inspection for at least two years. See 
IMAGE Certification Benefits (ICE), online at http://www.ice.gov/image/benefits.htm (visit-
ed Mar 4, 2013).  
 18  In testimony before Congress’s subcommittee on immigration policy and en-
forcement, ICE’s Deputy Director Kumar Kibble explained that ICE’s worksite enforce-
ment is effectively designed to target those employers who “knowingly” hire unauthor-
ized workers through the use of criminal and civil immigration laws and to regulate all 
other employers by encouraging them to join voluntary compliance programs. See ICE 
Worksite Enforcement—Up to the Job? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration 
Policy and Enforcement of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong, 1st Sess 
79, 79 (2011) (statement of Kumar Kibble, Deputy Director, ICE). One study suggests 
that while the total number of arrests for criminal charges in worksite enforcement mat-
ters has remained fairly constant between 2009 and 2010, the percentage of arrests of 
“managerial employees” has risen from 28 percent to 51 percent. See Bruno, Immigra-
tion-Related Worksite Enforcement at 8 (cited in note 2).  
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gration policy now permits otherwise removable migrants to dis-
rupt the removal process. The clearest example is a 2011 Memo-
randum of Understanding (MOU) that binds both the Depart-
ments of Labor (DOL) and Homeland Security (DHS).19 The 
MOU attempts to cure the asymmetric allocation of regulatory 
power, which typically favored DHS in the past.20 The key fea-
ture of the MOU is the power it grants DOL to displace DHS in 
the course of investigating a workplace. An active DOL investi-
gation has the effect of shielding that workplace against DHS 
intervention.21 Unauthorized workers typically will not blow the 
whistle on employers without assurances that sensitive, immi-
gration-related information of a complainant will not be shared 
with other agencies.22 Although similar MOUs had informed the 
enforcement decisions of labor and immigration agencies in the 
past,23 the 2011 version provides the clearest guidance to date as 
to the specific circumstances in which a regulatory firewall will 
prevent information regarding a worker’s status from being 
shared with other agencies. 
Changes regarding the administration of U visas have 
achieved a similar effect. U visas are available to otherwise re-
movable immigrants who have been the victims of a wide range 
of criminal activity.24 As immigration scholars have argued, U 
visas have the potential for expanding the scope of labor  
protections in the workplace.25 Although the executive lacks the 
authority to change the formal certification requirements for U  
visa eligibility, it can change the entry points for victims of qual-
ifying crimes to begin the application process. In 2011, DOL re-
 
 19 Revised Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Homeland 
Security and Labor Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites *2 (Dec 7, 2011), online 
at http://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013).  
 20  I have written about this dynamic in previous work. See generally Stephen Lee, 
Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 Ariz L Rev 1089 (2011).  
 21 See Revised Memorandum of Understanding at *2 (cited in note 19) (“ICE agrees 
to refrain from engaging in civil worksite enforcement activities at a worksite that is the 
subject of an existing DOL investigation of a labor dispute.”). 
 22 See Gleeson, 35 L & Soc Inq at 562–63 (cited in note 10). 
 23 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, Department of Justice and the Employment Standards Administration, De-
partment of Labor *1–3 (June 6, 1992), reprinted in 69 Interpreter Releases 829, 829–30 
(1992); Memorandum of Understanding between the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Department of Justice and the Employment Standards Administration, Department 
of Labor *1–6 (Nov 23, 1998), reprinted in 75 Interpreter Releases 1711, 1711–16 (1998).  
 24 See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 
§ 1513(b)(3)(U)(iii), Pub L No 106-386, 114 Stat 1464, 1535, amending INA 
§ 101(a)(15)(U)(iii), codified at 8 USC § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii).  
 25 See, for example, Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Pro-
tecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U Richmond L Rev 891, 944–51 (2008).  
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leased its U visa certification protocol.26 Although local police 
agencies, DHS, and other law enforcement agencies possess the 
same ability to certify such visas, agencies like DOL, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, and their state counter-
parts have greater expertise in identifying when a dispute in a 
particular workplace implicates the kind of criminal activity 
that may allow victims to receive U visas.27 Similarly, their mis-
sion orientations make it more likely both that in hard cases 
agency officials will resolve ambiguities in favor of the unauthor-
ized worker and that unauthorized workers will divulge their 
immigration status in the first place.28 Labor agency officials at 
the state level, who are also empowered in certain cases to certi-
fy U visa applications, have evinced a particular willingness to 
shed the misconception that they will share information with 
immigration enforcement agencies.29 
Finally, DHS has offered up the use of prosecutorial discre-
tion as a means of facilitating the enforcement of labor rights. 
Although presidents regularly shift enforcement priorities as 
administrations change (especially across party lines), what has 
made the Obama administration unique is the degree to which it 
has made such shifts transparent. A key feature of the Obama 
administration has been the open manner in which it has  
offered its enforcement agenda.30 The public has a window into 
the ordinarily shadowy world of discretionary decision making. 
A number of guidance memos clarify the factors line officers are 
 
 26 See DOL, Press Release, US Labor Department Announces Protocols for Certify-
ing U Visas Applications (Apr 28, 2011), online at http://www.dol.gov/whd/media/press/ 
whdpressVB3.asp?pressdoc=national/20110428.xml (visited Mar 4, 2013). For more detailed 
information on these U visa certification procedures and decisions, see Nancy Leppink, Field 
Assistance Bulletin No. 2011-1 (DOL Apr 28, 2011), online at http://www.dol.gov/ 
whd/FieldBulletins/fab2011_1.htm (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 27 See National Employment Law Project, The U Visa: A Potential Immigration Reme-
dy for Immigrant Workers Facing Labor Abuse 3 (Nov 2011), online at http://www.nelp.org/ 
page/-/Justice/2011/UVisa.pdf?nocdn=1 (visited Mar 4, 2013).  
 28 See Ming H. Chen, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Bureaucratic 
Politics in Federal Workplace Agencies Serving Undocumented Workers, 33 Berkeley J 
Emp & Labor L 227, 277–83 (2012). 
 29   See Shannon Gleeson, Conflicting Commitments: The Politics of Enforcing Im-
migrant Worker Rights in San Jose and Houston 76–77 (Cornell 2012). Consider Helen 
B. Marrow, Immigrant Bureaucratic Incorporation: The Dual Roles of Professional Mis-
sions and Government Policies, 74 Am Soc Rev 756 (2009) (discussing other examples of 
protection of immigrant identity in service-oriented organizations).   
 30 John Morton, Director, ICE, Memorandum for all Field Office Directors, Special 
Agents in Charge, Chief Counsel, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, 
and Plaintiffs 1–3 (ICE June 17, 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure 
-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
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instructed to consider when making declination decisions.31 Im-
portantly, DHS has instructed low-level officers and attorneys to 
screen for “plaintiffs in non-frivolous lawsuits regarding civil 
rights or liberties violations” and “individuals engaging in a pro-
tected activity related to civil or other rights (for example, union 
organizing or complaining to authorities about employment dis-
crimination or housing conditions) who may be in a non-
frivolous dispute with an employer, landlord, or contractor.”32 
Certainly, the articulation of such factors provides no guaran-
tees against removal. One does not have a right to obtain the ex-
ercise of prosecutorial discretion.33 But at the very least, these 
memos establish specific facts around which immigration offi-
cials and counsel (if a migrant has one) can negotiate. More than 
anything, these regulatory strategies all suggest that the execu-
tive is trying to harmonize immigration and labor enforcement 
goals by resolving statutory and regulatory conflicts in favor of 
worker rights. 
II.  SCREENING FOR SOLIDARITY 
Why permit otherwise-removable immigrants to pursue la-
bor claims? The standard response is that such claims are 
thought to protect the rights and interests of citizen workers by 
deterring unauthorized migration over the long term. Yet, this 
justification is hard to take seriously. The unauthorized migrant 
population has remained high over the last several years despite 
the ramp-up in workplace enforcement efforts.34 Furthermore, 
resource constraints and countervailing immigration enforce-
ment policies suggest that this population is unlikely to abate in 
the foreseeable future.35 As ICE explains, “Worksite enforcement 
investigations often involve egregious violations of criminal 
statutes by employers and widespread abuses. . . . By uncovering 
such violations, ICE can send a strong deterrent message to other 
 
 31 See generally John Morton, Director, ICE, Memorandum for all Field Office Di-
rectors, Special Agents in Charge, Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 
Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Ap-
prehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), online at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (vis-
ited Mar 4, 2013); Morton, Memorandum, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims (cited 
in note 30).  
 32 See Morton, Memorandum, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims at 2 (cited 
in note 30). 
 33 Consider id at 3 (noting that the prosecutorial discretion memo creates no en-
forceable private right of action). 
 34 See notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 35  See notes 48–58 and accompanying text. 
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employers who knowingly employ illegal aliens.”36 Enabling un-
authorized workers to pursue labor claims is thought to bolster 
the deterrence effect. If employers recruit unauthorized workers 
as part of a cost-savings measure, then the enforcement of labor 
claims diminishes the appeal of hiring unauthorized workers in 
the first place. 
At heart, such a policy is pragmatic in nature and is ulti-
mately concerned with the interests of domestic and native 
workers. The executive permits unauthorized migrants to bene-
fit from our nation’s labor laws because doing so fortifies the la-
bor rights of citizen and other authorized workers.37 Many feder-
al courts have adopted this view,38 including the Supreme Court. 
In Sure-Tan, Inc v NLRB,39 the Court explained that the en-
forcement of labor laws against employers suppressed business-
es’ appetite for migrant labor, thus creating “fewer incentives for 
aliens themselves to enter in violation of the federal immigra-
tion laws.”40 Although a majority of the Court declined to extend 
that principle in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v NLRB,41 
which concerned the availability of backpay to unauthorized 
workers, the deterrence rationale still found some continuity 
through Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent, in which he argued 
that “the backpay remedy is necessary; it helps make labor law 
enforcement credible; it makes clear that violating the labor 
laws will not pay.”42 
In this Part, I defend the recent turn in workplace enforce-
ment policy, but I do so on the basis of an alternative justifica-
tion. Here, I explain that focusing on migrants with labor claims 
advances not immigration’s enforcement goals, but rather its 
member-selection goals. Specifically, conferring immigration 
benefits to migrants who are willing to stand in solidarity with 
other workers fulfills a screening purpose: it helps identify those 
migrants with whom current members—especially US work-
ers—feel the strongest economic and social bonds. 
 
 36 Worksite Enforcement (ICE), online at http://www.ice.gov/worksite (visited 
Mar 4, 2013).   
 37  As DHS explains, “Worksite enforcement . . . reduces the demand for illegal em-
ployment and protects employment opportunities for the nation’s lawful workforce.” See 
Fact Sheet (cited in note 11) (emphasis added).  
 38 See, for example, Agri Processor Co v NLRB, 514 F3d 1, 5 (DC Cir 2008). 
 39 467 US 883 (1984). 
 40 Id at 893–94.  
 41 535 US 137 (2002). 
 42 Id at 154 (Breyer dissenting). 
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These bonds are important. They increase the likelihood 
that a migrant will be integrated into society peacefully and 
with minimal burden on the interests of US workers, the cross 
section of Americans traditionally most affected by unauthorized 
labor migration.43 To be clear, the scope of labor rights, which 
might lead to membership benefits under a solidarity rationale, 
is somewhat narrow. But focusing on the principle of solidarity 
reminds us that the long-term goal of member selection—
whether it is achieved through formal admission rules or de fac-
to enforcement policies—is to achieve the meaningful integra-
tion of new members.44 
A. The Screening Framework 
In recent years, immigration scholarship has tried to recon-
ceptualize immigration enforcement decisions as screening deci-
sions. Proponents of this view argue that removal decisions are 
sensibly understood as membership decisions where immigra-
tion officials initiate removal proceedings against unauthorized 
migrants deemed undesirable by membership criteria.45 The cri-
teria for desirability can change over time and across admin-
istrations, and membership benefits that the executive can  
distribute range in degrees of formality.46 But the salient point is 
that the basis of the desirability determination is the migrant’s 
conduct during her stay in the United States. A member-
 
 43 See George J. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexam-
ining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, 118 Q J Econ 1335, 1368–69 
(2003).  In certain industries, immigrant workers compete not with citizens but with oth-
er recent immigrants. See Jennifer Gordon, Tensions in Rhetoric and Reality at the In-
tersection of Work and Immigration, 2 UC Irvine L Rev 125, 129–30 (2012); Frank D. 
Bean, et al, Luxury, Necessity, and Anachronistic Workers: Does the United States Need 
Unskilled Immigrant Labor?, 56 Am Beh Scientist 1008, 1010 (2012). 
 44 Stephen Yale-Loehr and Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, A Comparative Look at Im-
migration and Human Capital Assessment, 16 Georgetown Immig L J 99, 101–02 (2001). 
 45  See, for example, Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure 
of Immigration Law, 59 Stan L Rev 809, 835–38 (2007); Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, 
A Visa to “Snitch”: An Addendum to Cox and Posner, 87 Notre Dame L Rev 973, 988 
(2012); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 Stan L Rev 
1103, 1118–19 (2009).   
 46 A central tenet of this position is that while Congress retains formal authority to 
define categories governing “deportability” and “inadmissibility,” as a functional matter, 
the executive controls the boundaries of membership through the exercise of discretion 
in deciding whether to initiate (or not initiate) removal proceedings. See Cox and Posner, 
59 Stan L Rev at 845–46 (cited in note 45). See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role 
of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 Conn Pub Interest L J 243, 243–45 
(2010) (arguing prosecutorial discretion is based in “statute, agency memoranda, and 
court decisions,” and that immigration officers exercise discretion based on “redeeming 
qualities” such as family ties, gainful employment, and the payment of taxes). 
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selection system designed around what a migrant has actually 
done (as opposed to what a migrant promises to do) after entry 
provides immigration officials with better and more information 
about that particular migrant’s membership potential.47 
In the context of the workplace, unauthorized migrants’ 
tenuous status as de facto members leaves them vulnerable to 
exploitation at the hands of employers—and this is precisely 
where the screening framework can help clarify the significance 
of allowing unauthorized migrants to assert labor claims against 
their employers. In particular, a migrant’s willingness to chal-
lenge an employer’s anti-union activities points to that worker’s 
willingness to stand in solidarity with US workers. The asser-
tion of such claims, according to the screening framework, pro-
vides valuable information about that migrant’s potential as a 
future member (and worker) in the United States. The presence 
of these cross-status social and economic bonds increases the 
likelihood that a migrant’s integration will occur with minimal 
disruption to US-worker interests. Framed this way, the pur-
pose of a worker-centric workplace enforcement policy is not to 
deter unauthorized migration but to provide a basis for deter-
mining which migrants among the eight million unauthorized 
migrants in the workforce are the strongest candidates for bene-
fits in the form of temporary or formal membership. 
The screening framework operates within existing enforce-
ment realities. To begin with, the executive does not have nearly 
enough resources to confront the enormity of the unauthorized 
migration challenge. In 2011, the executive conceded that it had 
enough resources to remove no more than 400 thousand nonciti-
zens in any given year—less than 4 percent of the total  
unauthorized population.48 Therefore, immigration enforcement 
 
 47 Professors Adam Cox and Eric Posner argue that contact with the criminal jus-
tice system acts as a proxy for undesirability, which plausibly explains why the executive 
continues to focus on removing “criminal aliens.” Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 845–
46 (cited in note 45). Professor Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown makes a related argu-
ment in the context of foreign elites in the United States. Professor Brown argues that 
because many foreign elite visa holders have access to terrorist networks, such visa 
holders should be required to “snitch” before and after visas are issued. A visa holder’s 
willingness or reticence to share valuable information after a terrorist act reflects on 
that noncitizen’s desirability. Brown, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1004–06 (cited in note 45).  
 48 See John Morton, Director, ICE, Memorandum for all Employees, Civil Immigra-
tion Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Aliens (Mar 
2, 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf 
(visited Mar 4, 2013) (“ICE, however, only has resources to remove approximately 
400,000 aliens per year, less than 4 percent of the estimated illegal alien population in 
the United States.”).  
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decisions have been reframed as decisions about selecting mem-
bers who will comprise the 96 percent of the unauthorized popu-
lation that will likely never formally face removal proceedings. 
These enforcement decisions directly engage the social engineer-
ing aspects of immigration policy.  
Resource constraints also hamper the ability of immigration 
officials to inspect a larger number of workplaces. The number of 
notices of intent to fine has increased, but the number of busi-
nesses has also increased even while the size of the average 
business establishment has decreased.49 As Professors Janice 
Fine and Jennifer Gordon point out, most of the industries iden-
tified as posing the greatest risk of Fair Labor Standards Act of 
193850 (FLSA) violations are comprised of firms and establish-
ments employing fewer than twenty people.51 Of course, larger 
businesses that commit egregious immigration and labor-related 
violations may continue to invite scrutiny under the Obama ad-
ministration, but to the extent DHS wants to use enforcement 
decisions to achieve a larger deterrence effect, the fragmented 
nature of the market frustrates the administration’s ability to 
actually inspect even a significant minority of businesses. Indeed, 
the unauthorized migrant population has grown and stabilized 
over the last ten years. Today, approximately eleven million un-
authorized migrants reside in the United States, which amounts 
to nearly 30 percent of the total foreign-born population.52 The 
estimated unauthorized migrant population has increased since 
President Obama assumed office. DHS estimated that 10.8 mil-
lion unauthorized migrants resided within the United States in 
2009.53 DHS estimated that the unauthorized population grew to 
 
 49 Compare Fact Sheet (cited in note 11) (showing 495 final orders resulting in 
nearly $12.5 million in fines for 2012), with Priorities and the Rule of Law Hearing, 
112th Cong, 1st Sess at 17 (cited in note 12) (reporting 18 final orders resulting in 
$675,000 in fines for 2008); Immigration Enforcement at 35 (cited in note 13) (reporting 
only 3 notices of intent to fine issued in 2004). See also Janice Fine and Jennifer Gordon, 
Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through Partnerships with Workers’ Organ-
izations, 38 Polit & Socy 552, 554 (2010) (showing that the average size of businesses 
declined between 1990 and 2005 and that the past thirty years has seen a 112 percent 
increase in the number of businesses covered under the FLSA).  
 50 Pub L No 75-718, ch 676, 52 Stat 1060, codified as amended at 29 USC § 201 et seq.  
 51 Fine and Gordon, 38 Polit & Socy at 554–55 (cited in note 49). 
 52 See Passel and Cohn, National and State Trends, 2010 at 10 (cited in note 2). 
Another twelve million lawful permanent residents (LPRs) could be rendered removable on 
the basis of post-entry conduct (typically criminal conduct). See id; INA § 237(a)(2), 8 USC 
§ 1227(a)(2). 
 53 See Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, Estimates of the Unau-
thorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2009 2 (DHS Jan 
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11.6 million in 2010 and receded slightly to 11.5 million in 
2011.54 Thus, the increased allocation of resources to worksite 
enforcement has not generated measurable gains in terms of de-
terrence. By contrast, under a screening framework, the pres-
ence of a stable and significant unauthorized population does not 
represent the failure of an enforcement policy so much as it repre-
sents a pool of potential (and potentially exploitable) members.55 
This leads to a second and related point: worksite-
enforcement strategy appears to be working at cross-purposes 
with DHS’s border enforcement strategy. Embedded within the 
deterrence theory of workplace enforcement is that allowing 
workers to press their labor claims will discourage employers 
from hiring unauthorized workers in the future, which in turn 
will cause workers to “self-deport.” But the increasing costs as-
sociated with crossing back over the border render this scenario 
unlikely.56 As Professor Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar observes, 
“[T]he mix of labor market incentives and limited legal immigra-
tion opportunities all but ensures a vast, long-term undocu-
mented population in the United States which has been increas-
ingly discouraged from leaving because of a build-up in border 
security.”57 Indeed, in a twist on the traditional narrative,  
migrants appear to receive “reverse remittances” from sending 
countries while they wait out the economic downturn.58  
B. Harnessing Social Bonds to Facilitate Integration 
The screening literature has focused primarily on how im-
migration screens for “undesirability.” It has explored how en-
gaging in criminal behavior or facilitating terrorist activity59 can 
lead to removal, thus building the national community through 
 
2010), online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2009.pdf 
(visited Mar 4, 2013).  
 54 See Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker, Estimates: January 2011 at 3 (cited in note 8). 
 55 See David A. Martin, Eight Myths about Immigration Enforcement, 10 NYU J 
Leg & Pub Pol 525, 545 (2007). 
 56 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2 UC Irvine L Rev 147, 157 (2012) 
(showing the extortion rate of human smuggling across the border increased from $500 
in 1986 to $3,000 in 2008). 
 57 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 UC 
Irvine L Rev 1, 7 (2012). 
 58 Consider Marc Lacey, Money Starts to Trickle North as Mexicans Help Out Rela-
tives, NY Times A1 (Nov 16, 2009) (describing the rise of “reverse remittances,” where 
families in Mexico have increasingly been sending money to family members in the 
United States who were negatively affected by the economic downturn).  
 59 See, for example, Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 845–46 (cited in note 45); 
Brown, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1004–06 (cited in note 45). 
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a process of attrition. But because the executive allows certain 
workers to temporarily or permanently avoid removal—either in 
the form of a U visa or the favorable exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion—the screening challenge is slightly different. The 
vast majority of the eight million unauthorized workers will 
never be removed either because such an outcome is politically 
unpalatable, administratively infeasible, or both. Most of these 
workers will effectively be allowed to remain and access US la-
bor markets, even if they lack any formal membership rights. 
Therefore, the screening challenge involves identifying “desira-
ble” workers to whom membership benefits should be affirma-
tively granted.  
On this point, when immigration law screens for “desirable” 
members, it often prefers those migrants who easily integrate 
into the mainstream.60 And one way immigration law sets out to 
identify those who are most likely to integrate is to rely on the 
presence of social bonds between current and new members. The 
use of social bonds to identify potential members is most readily 
appreciable in the context of family-based migration. The immi-
gration code very clearly allocates membership benefits to  
“immediate relatives”61 and other family members.62 Parents can 
sponsor their children; wives can sponsor their husbands; sisters 
can sponsor their brothers.63 Importantly, one of the assumptions 
built into this system is that migrants who gain entrance into the 
national community through the family will nestle into a more 
stable community than those who are admitted without a com-
parable social network, which in turn increases the likelihood of 
integration into the mainstream. Thus, a system of family-based 
migration represents more than our federal branches recognizing 
 
 60 Immigration and citizenship laws focus on a variety of characteristics to assess a 
migrant’s potential to integrate into the mainstream. In the naturalization context, two 
obvious examples are requiring applicants to possess a basic understanding of English 
and US history and civics. See INA § 312(a), 8 USC § 1423(a). As is well known by now, 
in the past, the integration rationale has been used to justify the exclusion of certain 
classes of migrants on the basis of race. See Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 
581, 595–96 (1889) (noting that Chinese migrants proved “impossible . . . to assimilate” 
with white Americans and that they were unwilling “to make any change in their habits 
or modes of living”). 
 61 See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 USC § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 62 See INA § 203(a)(1)–(4), 8 USC § 1153(a)(1)–(4). 
 63 See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 USC § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (listing “immediate relatives” 
of citizens as eligible for permanent residence); INA § 203(a)(1)–(4), 8 USC § 1153(a)(1)–
(4) (determining family-sponsored immigrants). 
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the right of its members to have a family; it also reflects a prag-
matic attempt to integrate and stabilize migrant communities.64 
Importantly, the presence of social bonds alone will not lead 
to membership. Almost all sponsors of family-based immigrants 
must promise to assume financial responsibility over the incom-
ing member, thus ensuring a baseline level of economic produc-
tivity and, at the very least, guarding against the possibility 
that the new member will become an economic burden to the 
public.65 In this sense, immigration law privatizes the responsi-
bility of integrating new members into society. This is a part of 
why US immigration law values social bonds: by vouching for 
the new member, the citizen sponsor promises to individually 
provide support so the public will not have to. This feature sepa-
rates US migration rules from those of other industrialized 
countries, like Canada, where the state assumes a greater re-
sponsibility over the integration of migrants.66 The US model of 
migration grants current members the right to sponsor new mem-
bers, but it also foists on them the responsibility to oversee the in-
tegration process and to internalize some of the associated costs. 
Using bonds with current members to sort potential mem-
bers also comports with principles of fairness and notions of jus-
tice. As Professor Hiroshi Motomura explains, immigration law 
tends to offer a greater array of protections to residents as time 
passes and their affiliation with the United States deepens. An 
“affiliation-based approach” to immigration law rests on two 
intuitions, according to Professor Motomura.67 One is that an in-
dividual’s decision to migrate represents “a gradual decline in a 
newcomer’s attachment to her former country as part of an in-
cremental process in which her life’s center of gravity shifts to 
the United States.”68 The other is that  
 
 64 See Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and 
Marriage?: Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 Hofstra L Rev 273, 285–86 (2003). 
See also Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 Minn L 
Rev 1625, 1637–38 (2007).  
 65 See INA § 212(a)(4)(C)(ii), 8 USC § 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii) (requiring sponsors of family-
based immigrants to file an affidavit of support over the immigrant); INA § 213A, 8 USC 
§ 1183a (listing the requirements of the sponsor’s affidavit of support). The immigration 
code does exempt certain immigrants from the affidavit of support requirement, but 
these are limited to special classes of immigrants who are vulnerable to family-based 
violence. See, for example, INA § 212(a)(4)(C)(i)(I)–(III), 8 USC § 1182(a)(4)(C)(i)(I)–(III). 
 66 See Irene Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Struc-
tured Mobilization and Immigrant Political Incorporation, 85 Soc Forces 667, 679 (2006). 
 67 Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and 
Citizenship in the United States 89 (Oxford 2006). 
 68 Id.  
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belonging is principally a matter of social connections. Even 
if this belonging is something less than citizenship itself, it 
seems unjust to disregard a lawful immigrant’s life in Amer-
ica. To do so would leave her recognized as belonging only in 
another country, typically where she is a citizen but lacks 
real connections.69 
The policy choice to focus on connections to current mem-
bers recognizes that migration, and the process of growing the 
national community more generally, can be a disruptive process 
for both the migrant and the host society. Unauthorized labor 
migration can be especially disruptive to US workers, the seg-
ment of the population whose wages are often the most directly 
affected by the presence of unauthorized workers.70 Because this 
tension animates the labor market, selecting new members out 
of the unauthorized migrant pool requires a delicate hand.  
On this point, Professor Cristina Rodríguez’s critique of 
guest-worker programs proves helpful. She argues against the 
adoption of a large-scale guest-worker program because it un-
dermines immigration law’s long-term goal of integration.71 Im-
portantly, a key part of Professor Rodríguez’s vision of integra-
tion involves fostering and preserving social peace: “Successful 
assimilation . . . should be defined by immigrants becoming full 
participants in the country’s economic, social, and cultural life—
by their becoming not only contributors, but also equals. Suc-
cess further depends on whether immigration is absorbed with 
minimal social cleavages and inter-group competition.”72 Although 
she does not directly address unauthorized labor migration, Pro-
fessor Rodríguez’s observation holds across contexts. If the un-
authorized population will remain inflated within the United 
States, enabling US workers to influence who among this larger 
population might earn immigration benefits can help reduce the 
likelihood of conflict. This resonates with immigration law’s 
larger integrationist aspirations, a process through which mem-
bers of immigrant groups and host societies come to resemble 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 See Borjas, 118 Q J Econ at 1370 (cited in note 43) (estimating that immigration 
from 1980 to 2000 resulted in US workers’ “wage[s] falling by 8.9 percent for high school 
dropouts, 4.9 percent for college graduates, 2.6 percent for high school graduates, and 
barely changing for workers with some college”). 
 71 Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What 
Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U Chi Legal F 219, 221.  
 72  Id at 229–30, 234 (“[A] focus on integration is required to promote social peace. 
It is in our interest to acknowledge that migrants are here to stay and to facilitate their 
becoming functional and well-adjusted members of our society.”). 
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one another over time and across economic and sociocultural 
dimensions.73   
Labor claims operate as a rough proxy for mutuality and 
commitment among workers. Like all proxies, labor claims are 
imperfect. A sense of solidarity need not exist only among work-
ers. In many industries, like home care, the solidarity model 
makes for an awkward fit given that home workers often work 
in isolation and have few people to call coworkers. Indeed, they 
may very well feel a deep sense of loyalty to their employers. 
Adults spend an inordinate amount of time in the workplace,74 
and for adult migrants, it likely represents one of the only social 
institutions in which migrants face opportunities to interact 
with native workers.75 Professor Kerry Abrams makes an analo-
gous point about the use of marriage to sort committed relation-
ships in the family-based migration context. She points out that 
a more accurate method of screening might be allowing reunifi-
cation for unmarried couples in committed relationships and 
denying reunification to married couples evincing signs of dys-
functionality, but employing such a model would come at a cost.76 
For similar reasons, immigration officials could, in theory, develop 
screening methods for identifying intimacy in the workplace 
whether such relationships track or cut across the management-
labor divide. But such an endeavor would prove challenging and 
costly given competing obligations. 
C.  Cross-Status Solidarity 
Although the executive has tried to accommodate the en-
forcement of labor rights by unauthorized migrants on deter-
rence grounds, the screening framework suggests that there 
may be member-selection reasons for allowing labor-
enforcement goals to displace immigration enforcement goals. 
But what does the willingness to assert labor claims suggest 
about an unauthorized worker’s membership potential? Here, I 
explain that certain types of labor claims require the presence of 
social and economic bonds between immigrant and citizen work-
 
 73 See Susan K. Brown and Frank D. Bean, Assimilation Models, Old and New: Ex-
plaining a Long-Term Process (Migration Policy Institute Oct 2006), online at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=442 (visited Mar 4, 2013) (de-
scribing and defining the assimilation of immigrant groups).  
 74 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the 
Law, 89 Georgetown L J 1, 8–9 (2000). 
 75 See id at 3. 
 76 Abrams, 91 Minn L Rev at 1668–69 (cited in note 64). 
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ers. These bonds, in turn, suggest the capacity and desire to in-
tegrate into society. Moreover, because these bonds are with 
low-skilled US workers—a class of workers that has traditional-
ly opposed the migration of low-wage migrant workers77—
selecting these immigrant workers helps minimize the possibil-
ity of social and economic tension that can arise between these 
classes of workers, at least where the claim that is being ad-
vanced arises from worker organizing efforts.  
Under the labor code, workers exert power over manage-
ment by withholding their labor. This threat becomes credible 
only when the workers have demonstrably organized them-
selves, set aside their individual short-term interests, and com-
mitted to the long-term interests of the larger workforce. Thus, 
in the most general terms, our nation’s labor laws advance a vi-
sion of collective rights grounded in a principle of mutuality, or 
as the National Labor Relations Act78 (NLRA) puts it: “Employ-
ees shall have the right to self-organization . . . and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection.”79 For a worker to forgo indi-
vidual gain is not to act irrationally but to recognize and em-
brace the “promise of reciprocal benefit.”80 
Many workplace laws are grounded in a vision of collective 
rights and at the heart of this vision is the principle of solidari-
ty. A basic definition of solidarity is the willingness to work only 
if doing so will not violate workplace laws or existing labor 
agreements.81 It is an ethical commitment to forgo individual 
gain in the interests of a larger set of community interests. Alt-
hough the law accommodates some group-based rights under 
certain circumstances,82 it would be hard to point to another ar-
ea of law that has developed a vision of collective rights to the 
same extent as the labor code. 
 
 77 See Gordon H. Hanson, Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance 
and Political Opposition to Open Borders 3–4 (Institute for International Economics 2005). 
 78 Pub L No 74-198, ch 372, 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified at 29 USC §§ 151–69. 
 79 NLRA § 7, 49 Stat at 452, codified at 29 USC § 157.  
 80 See Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protect-
ed Protest Activities under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 Colum L Rev 789, 801 
(1989) (explaining how employees’ concern about their coworkers’ plights may benefit 
those employees in future disputes of their own). See also Benjamin I. Sachs, Employ-
ment Law as Labor Law, 29 Cardozo L Rev 2685, 2739–43 (2008) (citing laboratory ex-
periments confirming the reciprocity principle).  
 81 See Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S Cal L Rev 503, 509 
(2007) (“[S]olidarity with other workers . . . [is] expressed as a commitment to refuse to 
work under conditions that violate the law or labor agreements.”).  
 82 See, for example, FRCP 23 (defining the requirements for class action suits). 
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This principle of solidarity finds its greatest support in 
workplace laws in those instances where a worker accepts the 
“promise of reciprocal benefit” as a part of a larger set of self-
interested choices made by rational actors.83 This vision of self-
interested action is most apparent where workers engage in acts 
of solidarity with workers within the same workplace. In certain 
instances, courts have recognized as legally cognizable acts of 
solidarity that cut across workplaces. Thus, where two drivers 
working for a chemical waste hauling company refused to pick 
up waste from a customer whose workers were on strike, Judge 
Richard Posner recognized that the drivers “may have felt that 
strengthening the union movement by honoring a union’s picket 
line would promote their own economic interests as workers.”84  
Some labor scholars have argued that this vision of solidari-
ty remains unduly narrow. More than twenty years ago, Profes-
sor Richard Michael Fischl argued that this “self-interested” 
view of solidarity “devalues the individual whose personal plight 
is at stake by treating her as a mere means to her colleagues’ 
self-interested ends.”85 More recently, Professor James Gray 
Pope argued that the NLRA’s mutuality principle has been mis-
construed as generating a “network of tit-for-tat expectations.”86 
According to Professor Pope, this cramped understanding of sol-
idarity fails to capture the “movement culture of labor” where 
workers are “ ‘sisters’ and ‘brothers’ bound together by workplace 
community, trade, industry, and class.”87 
 Labor sociologists have begun documenting instances where 
unauthorized migrants have stood in solidarity with citizen 
workers to enforce their workplace rights.88 Professor Ruth 
 
 83 James Gray Pope, Class Conflicts of Law II: Solidarity, Entrepreneurship, and 
the Deep Agenda of the Obama NLRB, 57 Buff L Rev 653, 663–67 (2009) (recognizing the 
circumstances under which workers self-organize). See also Fischl, 89 Colum L Rev at 
796 (cited in note 80) (highlighting a circumstance where workers pressed for an employ-
ee’s case, motivated by their own future well-being). 
 84 NLRB v Browning-Ferris Industries, Chemical Services, Inc, 700 F2d 385, 387 
(7th Cir 1983).  
 85 Fischl, 89 Colum L Rev at 792, 797–98 (cited in note 80).  
 86 Pope, 57 Buff L Rev at 672–73 (cited in note 83). 
 87 Id at 662. 
 88 See, for example, Caitlin C. Patler, Alliance-Building and Organizing for Immi-
grant Rights: The Case of the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, in 
Ruth Milkman, Joshua Bloom, and Victor Narro, eds, Working for Justice: The LA Model 
of Organizing and Advocacy 71, 78–81 (ILR 2010) (documenting a Los Angeles coalition’s 
focus on mobilizing undocumented immigrants, and the coalition’s role in the develop-
ment of the Garment Worker Center to fight against labor law violations in the garment 
industry); Marco Hauptmeier and Lowell Turner, Political Insiders and Social Activists: 
Coalition Building in New York and Los Angeles, in Lowell Turner and Daniel B. Corn-
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Milkman recounts one particularly vivid example of workers at 
a doors and windows factory who began protesting the firm’s de-
cision to close the factory and relocate to a nonunion facility.89 
Garnering the support of a variety of private donors and elected 
officials (including then–President elect Obama), the workers 
eventually achieved a sizeable settlement.90 But as Professor 
Milkman observes, an important point that was lost in the 
mainstream coverage of the dispute was the composition of the 
workers: most workers were unauthorized workers from Mexico 
and Central America and they earned the support of many of 
their fellow African American native workers.91 The workplace 
action represented a joint effort cutting across immigration and 
citizenship lines. Of course, different labor markets experience 
the effects of unauthorized migration differently; US workers in 
some regions might be more inclined to support the interests of 
unauthorized workers than in others. But this growing litera-
ture suggests that a worker’s identity can transcend immigra-
tion status and other differences.  
Examining labor claims through a screening lens supple-
ments existing accounts, which have tended to embrace a 
claims-making stance. For example, in Agri Processor Co v 
NLRB,92 the DC Circuit held that unauthorized workers in a 
meat processing plant could belong to the same collective bar-
gaining unit as authorized workers despite their immigration 
status.93 Professor Motomura suggests that Agri Processor ex-
emplifies how noncitizen interests can often be repackaged as 
citizens’ rights. He observes that unauthorized migrants can 
move through society outside of the law but can find some 
measure of relief within the law through their citizen coworkers 
operating as “interest surrogates” or “citizen proxies.”94 Thus, a 
theory of citizen proxies explains how citizens can help make 
noncitizens whole even if noncitizens lack formal rights.  
 
field, eds, Labor in the New Urban Battlegrounds: Local Solidarity in a Global Economy 
129, 137–38 (ILR 2007); Roger Waldinger, et al, Helots No More: A Case Study of the 
Justice for Janitors Campaign in Los Angeles, in Kate Bronfenbrenner, et al, eds, Organ-
izing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies 102, 116–18 (ILR 1998).  
 89 Ruth Milkman, Immigrant Workers, Precarious Work, and the US Labor Move-
ment, 8 Globalizations 361, 361–62 (2011). 
 90 Id at 362. 
 91 Id. 
 92 514 F3d 1 (DC Cir 2008). 
 93 Id at 2. 
 94 Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration outside 
the Law, 59 Duke L J 1723, 1754 (2010). 
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The solidarity framework extracts a slightly different lesson 
from Agri Processor. It takes notice of the fact that the citizen 
workers in Agri Processor evinced a willingness to undertake 
such an endeavor in the first place; that unauthorized workers 
overcame their individual fears of removal in the interests of 
advancing their claims to economic justice; and that citizen and 
noncitizen workers engage in the messy and sometimes perilous 
process of forming a community.95 And all of this information fa-
cilitates the member-selection process by identifying migrants 
who are willing to forgo individual benefits in the pursuit of rais-
ing working conditions more broadly.96 In other words, the soli-
darity framework suggests that the whole of citizen-noncitizen 
interactions in the workplace is greater than the sum of its indi-
vidual parts. 
D.  From Sojourn to Solidarity 
Academics, policy advocates, and the media have paid in-
creasing attention to remittances and the money transfer market, 
which immigrant workers’ wages support.97 While the subject of 
remittances typically casts a flattering light on unauthorized 
workers (as committed and compliant workers), it tends to per-
petuate the notion that immigrants are interested in migrating 
to the United States only for the purposes of accessing its labor 
markets, which offers higher wages relative to their sending 
countries.98 For this reason, unauthorized workers are often seen 
as unorganizable as “sojourners” who plan to return to the send-
ing country after a short stay.99 Yet, examples of unauthorized 
 
 95 Agri Processor, 514 F3d at 2, 9. 
 96 Id at 9. 
 97 See, for example, Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 Conn L Rev 1, 14–20 
(2008); Roberto Suro, et al, Billions in Motion: Latino Immigrants, Remittances and 
Banking 5–16 (Pew Hispanic Center Nov 22, 2002), online at http://www.pewhispanic.org/ 
files/reports/13.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013); Miriam Jordan, Migrants’ Cash Keeps Flowing 
Home, Wall St J A16 (Sept 24, 2012). 
 98  For example, a Pew Hispanic Center study interviewed over three hundred mi-
grant workers in the United States and, according to the study, almost all of the partici-
pants cited “the ability to contribute to a family budget back home [as] a major motiva-
tion in their decision to come to the United States.” Suro, Billions in Motion at 6 (cited in 
note 97). See also Jordan, Migrants’ Cash Keeps Flowing Home, Wall St J at A16 (cited 
in note 97) (reporting that although unauthorized workers have been affected by the eco-
nomic downturn, they are willing to make sacrifices “to keep money flowing back home”).  
 99  Ruth Milkman, L.A.’s Past, America’s Future? The 2006 Immigrant Rights Pro-
tests and Their Antecedents, in Kim Voss and Irene Bloemraad, eds, Rallying for Immi-
grant Rights: The Fight for Inclusion in 21st Century America 201, 204 (California 2011). 
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workers standing in solidarity with their coworkers suggest that 
the story can be more complicated than that.  
A migrant worker’s commitments may change over time. 
Migrants may initially plan on staying in the United States only 
a short while, just long enough to meet their income needs for 
the year, but they may soon realize that savings are harder to 
accumulate than they initially thought. Economic downturns 
dry up jobs, and the costs of illicit entry into the United States 
may suddenly (and coercively) increase at the hands of their 
smugglers,100 both of which can have the effect of prolonging a 
migrant’s stay in the United States.101 Over time, a migrant 
worker might begin to value her social and economic bonds with 
her citizen coworkers differently. Injustices that a migrant 
worker experiences during her time in the United States, espe-
cially at the hands of her employer, can affect her willingness to 
sacrifice her individual opportunities for work in the interests of 
standing in solidarity with other workers.102  
As a general matter, immigration scholarship is still devel-
oping a picture of citizen workers, immigrant workers, and the 
factors and conditions influencing whether they achieve some 
sense of solidarity. Outside of immigration law, family scholars 
have begun examining the related concept of friendship between 
adults in the workplace and the regulatory questions it poses.103 
As Professor Laura Rosenbury observes, 
Although such relationships are at times primarily transac-
tional, at other times they take on intimate qualities similar 
to those of family relationships or friendships. Workplaces 
 
 100  See Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 
UCLA L Rev 1161, 1213 (2008). Oftentimes, these costs can be foisted upon the workers 
in the form of debt, which must be paid off. Such conditions can give rise to coercion trig-
gering potential liability against employers for trafficking violations. See William Wil-
berforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 § 222(b)(3), Pub L 
No 110-457, 122 Stat 5044, 5068, codified at 18 USC § 1589; Kathleen Kim, The Coercion 
of Trafficked Workers, 96 Iowa L Rev 409, 450–53 (2011); Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions 
and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 
158 U Pa L Rev 1609, 1640–41 (2010). 
 101  See Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt, Conflict and Solidarity between African 
American and Latino Immigrant Workers 44–45 (Nov 30, 2007), online at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/GordonLenhardtpaperNov30.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013); 
Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 48 (cited in note 67) (discussing reasons for the lack 
of union solidarity among recent immigrant arrivals). 
 102 See Leticia M. Saucedo, African American-Immigrant Tensions: Myths, Realities and 
Policy Implications 7 (Warren Institute July 2008), online at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
files/Saucedo_African_Am_Immigrant_Tensions_Final_brief.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 103 For the importance of intimacy in non-family environments, see Laura A. Rosen-
bury, Working Relationships, 35 Wash U J L & Pol 117, 117–20 (2011).  
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are thus often sites of both intimacy and production, much 
like the home is a site of both intimacy and production, even 
though the law assigns production to the workplace and in-
timacy to the home.104 
One final note: the meaning of solidarity within the realm of 
immigration enforcement has changed and evolved over time. In 
decades past, immigration officials viewed workplace-related 
conflicts with suspicion given the strong conceptual ties between 
labor organizing as a tactic for improving working conditions 
and communism as a political ideology embraced by many na-
tions whose interests conflicted with those of the United States. 
During those decades in the early and mid-twentieth century 
when the spread of communism posed a foreign threat to Ameri-
can interests, federal officials often used immigration law to quash 
those domestic labor protests involving noncitizen participants.105 
The convergence of these goals generated administrative difficul-
ties. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)—the pre-
decessor to our various immigration agencies today—operated 
under the oversight of DOL for the early part of the twentieth 
century.106 Thus, the challenge of using immigration law to regu-
late workplace disputes foisted a set of conflicting goals onto the 
shoulders of DOL, causing Secretaries of Labor across admin-
 
 104 Id at 119. For example, Professor Viviana Zelizer explains that intimacy in the 
workplace can have a solidarity-enhancing effect. See Viviana A. Zelizer, Intimacy in 
Economic Organizations, 18 Rsrch Soc of Work 23, 24 (2009). Importantly, she defines 
intimacy as “privileged access to another person’s attention, information, and trust, all of 
which would damage the person if widely available to other people.” Id at 25. This cul-
ture of sensitive information sharing finds direct analogues throughout immigrant com-
munities where the fear of being “outed” as unauthorized pervasively regulates their 
lives. 
 105 For example, the Act of Oct 16, 1918 rendered excludable and deportable any 
noncitizens “who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the  
Government of the United States or of all forms of law.” Pub L No 65-221, ch 186, 40 Stat 
1012, repealed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub L No 82-414, 
ch 477, 66 Stat 163, codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq. As American officials 
watched the rise of the Bolshevik party during the Russian revolution, they feared the 
possibility of these worker-centric ideas spreading among the US working class. Immi-
gration officials were particularly wary of labor organizations, like the Industrial Work-
ers of the World, which waged aggressive organizing campaigns. See Kevin R. Johnson, 
The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the 
Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 St Mary’s L J 
833, 846–47 (1997). Similarly, the Internal Security Act of 1950 listed membership in the 
community as grounds for exclusion. See Internal Security Act of 1950 § 22, Pub L No 
81-831, ch 1024, 64 Stat 987, 1006–07, amending the Act of Oct 16, 1918, 40 Stat at 1012 
and repealed by INA § 403(a)(16), 66 Stat at 279.  
 106 For a brief overview of the historical development of INS, see Lee, 53 Ariz L Rev 
at 1091 n 6, 1110–13 (cited in note 20). 
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istrations to openly resist such a mandate, and in some cases, 
inviting charges of impeachment.107 Today, the national security 
goals have been largely disaggregated from workplace enforce-
ment goals. As 9/11 demonstrates, modern national security 
concerns appear in the form of discrete (but deadly) surprise at-
tacks.108 To the extent national security goals take immigration 
officials into the workplace at all, they do so only in those work-
places involving access to critical infrastructure. In other words, 
the challenge is not suppressing the spread of ideology, but ra-
ther categorically limiting access to work in airports, railways, 
and other workplaces central to the basic operation of national 
life.109 
E.  Some Qualifications 
My central claim has been that allocating membership bene-
fits to immigrants who stand in solidarity with their citizen 
coworkers facilitates the member-selection process. Allocating 
benefits on this basis prioritizes those migrant workers who 
have developed social and economic bonds with US and other 
authorized workers. And because migrants who have developed 
bonds with current members are more likely to successfully in-
tegrate into society than migrants without such bonds, screening 
for solidarity helps distinguish long-term residents from tempo-
rary sojourners. To be clear, this claim is subject to some im-
portant limitations. 
First, although labor and employment laws broadly apply to 
unauthorized workers, thus creating opportunities for cross-
status solidarity in the workplace, courts have narrowed their 
 
 107 See John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–
1925 228–29 (Rutgers 2d ed 1988) (describing the reluctance of Secretary of Labor Wil-
liam Wilson to enforce deportation orders during World War I). Frances Perkins, the 
Secretary of Labor during the Roosevelt administration, proved to be a particular annoy-
ance to members of Congress. In 1939, impeachment proceedings were brought against 
her. See Resolution for an Investigation of the Official Conduct of Frances Perkins, Secre-
tary of Labor; James L. Houghteling, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Department of Labor; and Gerard D. Reilly, Solicitor, Department of Labor, to 
Determine Whether or Not They Have Been Guilty of Any High Crimes or Misdemeanors 
Which, in the Contemplation of the Constitution, Requires the Interposition of the Consti-
tutional Powers of the House, HR Rep No 76-311, 76th Cong, 1st Sess (1939).  
 108 See Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the 
Wake of 9/11 73–97 (Rowman & Littlefield 2005). 
 109 Congress has simply excluded noncitizens from workplaces, such as airports. See 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 111(a), Pub L No 107-71, 115 Stat 597, 616–
17 (2001), codified at 49 USC § 44935. For a critical view of the executive’s post-9/11 in-
vocation of national security reasons to suppress labor rights, see Ruben J. Garcia, Labor’s 
Fragile Freedom of Association Post-9/11, 8 U Pa J Labor & Empl L 283, 304–07 (2006). 
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breadth in some significant ways. Specifically, judicial interpre-
tations have constrained the ability of unauthorized workers to 
engage in organizing activity under the NLRA. The Court’s deci-
sion to interpret the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s 
(IRCA) employer sanctions provision as displacing the NLRA’s 
reinstatement and backpay provisions is the most obvious ex-
ample of this dynamic.110 But courts have also limited the ability 
of unions to coordinate their activities with nonlabor groups or 
otherwise engage community organizations, which has frustrat-
ed the ability of communities of color to harness labor law to 
meet their needs.111 Similar stories could be told about other 
workplace laws, such as Title VII.112 Thus, while it may prove too 
much to suggest that unauthorized workers engage their citizen 
coworkers despite the current state of labor laws, neither is it 
entirely true that such organizing occurs because of labor and 
employment protections. 
A second qualification to my claim is that the employer can 
disrupt the opportunities for cross-status solidarity by segregat-
ing work responsibilities. In many industries, employers will 
relegate migrant workers to jobs involving little contact with 
customers because of their limited English-speaking skills while 
leaving native workers to comprise the “face” of the company.113 
In the restaurant industry, for example, new migrant workers 
will often work as cooks or busboys, but not as hosts or waiters. 
Such a dynamic not only creates segregated work conditions but 
also dampens the conditions under which organizing drives 
might otherwise flourish.114 Indeed, employers enjoy a signifi-
 
 110 IRCA, 100 Stat 3359; Hoffman Plastic, 535 US at 151 (holding that allowing the 
NLRB to award backpay to unauthorized immigrants conflicted with the IRCA). 
 111 See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Institutionalizing Economic Justice: A LatCrit Perspec-
tive on the Imperatives of Linking the Reconstruction of “Community” to the Transfor-
mation of Legal Structures That Institutionalize the Depoliticization and Fragmentation 
of Labor/Community Solidarity, 2 U Pa J Labor & Empl L 773, 799–804 (2000) (provid-
ing an overview of various judicial interpretations narrowing the LMRDA’s reach). As is 
well documented, immigrant communities are heavily dependent on community-based 
organizations in accessing services and navigating society generally. See, for example, S. 
Karthick Ramakrishnan and Celia Viramontes, Civic Spaces: Mexican Hometown  
Associations and Immigrant Participation, 66 J Soc Issues 155 (2010); Will Somerville, Ja-
mie Durana, and Aaron Matteo Terrazas, Hometown Associations: An Untapped Resource for 
Immigration Integration? (Migration Policy Institute July 2008), online at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/insight-htas-july08.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 112 See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for 
Intergroup Solidarity, 77 Ind L J 63, 79–82 (2002), citing Childress v City of Richmond, 
907 F Supp 934, 938–939 (ED Va 1995), affd 134 F3d 1205 (4th Cir 1998) (en banc).  
 113 See Gordon, 2 UC Irvine L Rev at 129–30 (cited in note 43). 
 114 In some workplaces, this is because employers have difficulty attracting US and 
other authorized workers. For example, the agricultural industry has had difficulty at-
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cant bargaining advantage over unauthorized migrants. Injus-
tices may lead to a sense of solidarity among the workforce, but 
such a legal consciousness must persist under the weight of a 
work culture that rewards subservience.115 
Professors Jennifer Gordon and Robin Lenhardt’s work de-
velops this point nicely. The vast majority of unauthorized mi-
grants are from Latin America (mostly Mexico) and Asia,116 and 
because they are, in certain labor markets, moving into low-
wage jobs once occupied by native black workers, Professors 
Gordon and Lenhardt point out that the workplace has become 
an arena structured for conflict.117 These workers, burdened by 
different origin stories, often bring different expectations to 
work that can obstruct their ability to organize around common 
points of interest, such as shared experiences of economic exploi-
tation, racial subordination, and poor working conditions. At the 
same time, these sorts of conflicts highlight why cross-status sol-
idarity carries so much promise as a means of identifying poten-
tial members. In those workplaces where unauthorized Latino 
workers and black native workers can organize themselves, 
signs of solidarity might demonstrate signs of “racial literacy,”118 
 
tracting US workers under current wages and conditions. See Kirk Johnson, Hiring Lo-
cally for Farm Work Is No Cure-All, NY Times A1 (Oct 5, 2011). See Gordon, 2 UC Irvine 
L Rev at 136–37 (cited in note 43) (explaining that employers often prefer temporary mi-
grant workers to citizen workers for reasons of subservience even if they are required to 
pay a higher hourly wage). 
 115 See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and 
the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 Ohio St L J 961, 976–79 (2006). The no-
tion of subservience is also expressed in racial terms. See Edward J.W. Park, Racial Ide-
ology and Hiring Decisions in Silicon Valley, 22 Qualitative Soc 223, 230 (1999) (noting 
that some employers avoid hiring white and black workers because of the perception that 
“they like to stand up for their rights” whereas “Asians and Mexicans are generally not 
like that”). To be fair, the issue of friendship between employers and unauthorized work-
ers can be complicated. In some industries, especially homecare, deep bonds of affection 
can develop between employers and workers. See Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unor-
ganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 
79 NC L Rev 45, 69–70 (2000). 
 116 One study estimates this figure to be over 90 percent. Jeffrey S. Passel and 
D’Vera Cohn, Trends in Unauthorized Immigration: Undocumented Inflow Now Trails 
Legal Inflow iii (Pew Hispanic Center Oct 2, 2008), online at http://pewhispanic.org/files/ 
reports/94.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013). 
 117 Gordon and Lenhardt, 55 UCLA L Rev at 1170–73 (cited in note 100). See also 
Joshua Bloom, Ally to Win: Black Community Leaders and SEIU’s L.A. Security Unioni-
zation Campaign, in Milkman, Bloom, and Narro, eds, Working for Justice 167, 169–70 
(cited in note 88). 
 118 Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J Am Hist 91, 100 (2004) (defining “ra-
cial literacy” as “the capacity to decipher the durable racial grammar that structures ra-
cialized hierarchies and frames the narrative of our republic”). 
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which can in turn help ease the racial conflict that might arise 
in communities beyond the workplace. Organizing campaigns, 
collective bargaining, secondary boycotts—these are all signs 
that migrants have achieved some shared understanding of un-
just treatment even as, and perhaps because, they confront in-
justices in the workplace.119 
The final qualification relates to the general downturn in 
the labor movement. As a number of immigration and labor 
scholars have noted, shifting economic and demographic reali-
ties have significantly reduced the number of unionized work-
places in the United States.120 The percentage of unionized 
workplaces is at a low last seen in 1916.121 Thus, even though 
migrant workers have collaborated with unions in a number of 
instances, the labor movement as a whole has been diminished, 
thus limiting the ability of unions to help organize and support 
migrant workers.122 
The decline of the labor movement (along with the realities 
of segregated workplaces) curtails the scope of my claim. If the 
strongest proxy for cross-status solidarity is NLRA claims aris-
ing out of unionized workplaces, then organized labor’s decline 
suggests that a regime of screening for solidarity may be more 
aspirational than operational. Yet, such a regime has room to 
grow. Although organized labor formally opposed or ignored the 
rights of unauthorized migrants and some classes of authorized 
ones for much of the twentieth century, the changing landscape 
has prompted labor to reconsider these long-held positions.123 
And even while labor organizations continue to discuss whether 
and to what extent they wish to organize across immigration 
 
 119 See Gordon and Lenhardt, 55 UCLA L Rev at 1230–36 (cited in note 100); Rodríguez, 
2007 U Chi Legal F at 229 (cited in note 71) (arguing that given the realities of unauthor-
ized migration and work, “a focus on integration is required to promote social peace”).  
 120 See, for example, Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: 
Individualism as a Cause for Labor’s Decline, 16 Hofstra Labor & Empl L J 133, 133 n 1 
(1998).  
 121 See Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year 
Low, 11.3%, NY Times B1 (Jan 23, 2013). An interesting point is that despite the nation-
al trend in declining union membership, California and other states in the southwest 
appear to be moving in the opposite direction. While the national percentage average of 
unionized workplaces hovers around 12.5 percent, the percentage in California sits at 
around 18.4 percent. See Alana Samuels, Latinos Lead the State’s Union Gains; Member-
ship Growth Bucks US Trend, LA Times A1 (Jan 24, 2013).  
 122 See Immanuel Ness, Immigrants, Unions, and the New U.S. Labor Market 44–45 
(Temple 2005). 
 123 Most notably, labor organizations tended to oppose temporary guest workers. See 
Gordon, 80 S Cal L Rev at 509, 553 (cited in note 81); Rodríguez, 2007 U Chi Legal F at 
279–81 (cited in note 71). 
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status lines,124 unauthorized workers appear to be forging ahead 
in some industries, drawing attention to and improving working 
conditions in a few notable instances.125 
III.  DESIGN QUESTIONS 
The executive has tracked rather than ignored unauthorized 
migrants asserting workplace rights, and such a choice has ad-
vanced rather than stalled the goal of identifying immigrants 
who are willing and able to form meaningful bonds with current 
members. So far, so good—but what will it take to translate this 
good idea into sustainable policy over the long term? In this 
Part, I explore three basic design questions that policymakers 
will have to address. One is a proper law question. Workplace-
related claims operate as proxies for solidarity, and like all prox-
ies, they are not without limitations. The limitations are not fa-
tal, but some types of workplace claims are more likely than 
others to reflect workplace bonds. Therefore, creating a taxono-
my of workplace claims can improve the screening process over 
the long-term. A second question involves delegation. To whom 
should screening authority be delegated? Although the executive 
has delegated labor enforcement power with some reluctance, 
the truth is that an array of delegation options exist within the 
universe of workplace regulation. A third and final question in-
volves timing: At what point in the migration process should 
workers be screened? Each model involves tradeoffs, which I 
address. 
A.  Which Types of Workplace Claims? 
Although I have been fixated on NLRA-type labor claims—
those claims involving collective rights stemming from union 
membership—the reality is that the workplace is regulated by a 
variety of laws grounded in both labor and employment law. 
Thus, if the screening goal is identifying those migrant workers 
with whom US workers feel the strongest bonds, one set of de-
sign questions should focus on determining which laws, within 
 
 124 See Chinyere Osuji, Building Power for “Noncitizen Citizenship”: A Case Study of 
the Multi-ethnic Immigrant Workers Organizing Network, in Milkman, Bloom, and Nar-
ro, eds, Working for Justice 89, 101–04 (cited in note 88). 
 125 See Edward J.W. Park, Labor Organizing beyond Race and Nation: The Los An-
geles Hilton Case, 24 Intl J Soc & Soc Pol 137, 138–39 (2004) (noting that while immi-
grants are less likely to hold unionized jobs they have “spearheaded some of the most 
successful and innovative labor campaigns”). 
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the larger suite of labor and employment laws, best capture this 
dynamic. 
Traditionally, labor law and employment law have been un-
derstood to function within two different and largely incompati-
ble paradigms. Labor law outlines a series of rights that are ex-
pressed collectively, whereas employment law articulates a set 
of rights that are asserted individually, largely through private 
rights of action.126 This conceptual distinction suggests that 
within the universe of workplace laws, labor law provides a finer 
sieve through which removal cases might be filtered. After all, 
the pursuit of labor remedies attendant to protected union or-
ganizing strongly suggests a firm embrace of and commitment to 
workplace bonds. 
At the same time, other labor laws contain no formal organ-
izing component, which diminishes their utility as a screening 
device. In Singh v Jutla,127 for example, the district court per-
mitted an unauthorized migrant to pursue an FLSA claim 
against his “business partner” for unpaid wages and overtime 
pay.128 It is less obvious how providing relief from removal in 
that instance furthers the goal of selecting members who evince 
workplace bonds with current members.129 
There are further complications. Larger shifts in the labor 
landscape suggest that organizing efforts in some sectors may be 
moving away from the traditional collective bargaining model.130 
Although the NLRA stands as the paradigmatic example of reg-
ulation through collective rights, over the last several years, 
workplace scholarship has begun exploring how parallel areas of 
workplace law have fostered organizing among workers. These 
 
 126 See Sachs, 29 Cardozo L Rev at 2688–89 (cited in note 80). 
 127 214 F Supp 2d 1056 (ND Cal 2002). 
 128 Id at 1057–59. 
 129 To be clear, providing relief from removal to the plaintiff in Singh is completely 
consistent with other immigration objectives related to workplace enforcement, namely 
deterring unauthorized migration and deterring the exploitation of workers. For descrip-
tions of the deterrence rationales, see Hoffman Plastic, 535 US at 153–54 (Breyer dis-
senting) (finding deterring unauthorized immigration to be a goal of immigration policy); 
Saucedo, 67 Ohio St L J at 980–86 (cited in note 115) (outlining the statutory goal of pre-
venting exploitation of workers); Donald M. Kerwin and Kristen McCabe, Labor Stand-
ards Enforcement and Low-Wage Immigrants: Creating an Effective Enforcement System 
44 (Migration Policy Institute July 2011), online at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/laborstandards-2011.pdf (visited Mar 4, 2013).  
 130 For example, the restaurant industry has proven to be resilient to organizing un-
ionization efforts, and yet Professor Sameer Ashar documents the ways in which the 
Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York has utilized a creative suite of organizing 
tools to achieve worker justice. Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance 
Movements, 95 Cal L Rev 1879, 1889–98 (2007). 
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scholarly interventions have been particularly noticeable in the 
context of employment law. As Professor Benjamin Sachs ar-
gues, the NLRA has proven to be both “too weak” and “too rigid” 
to accommodate the evolving organizing needs of workers, thus 
forcing workers to redirect their claims through employment law 
channels.131 Although employment rights are typically conceived 
as “individualistic,” in practice, workers have deployed them to 
achieve a sense of solidarity, a key part of which is “a shared ex-
perience of unjust treatment.”132 Employment violations strate-
gically framed as shared harms can help elevate that character-
istic within the hierarchy of identity characteristics including 
race, national origin, and language. Thus, although the NLRA 
has traditionally protected the collective interests of workers, 
standing beyond the NLRA’s shadow need not hamper organizing 
efforts. In fact, doing so, according to some proponents of this view, 
may liberate it. 
In short, solidarity entails individuals foregoing short-term 
gain in order to advance the community’s long-term gain. And 
while labor laws protect only those acts of solidarity that ad-
vance economic gains, other workplace laws, like employment 
laws, are not so limited. As the labor market continues to evolve, 
workers can respond by creatively redirecting legal claims 
through alternate channels to achieve a shared understanding of 
unjust treatment. 
A related question is whether and to what extent intragroup 
solidarity advances immigration’s integrationist goals. A part of 
the promise of screening for migrants engaging in intergroup, or 
cross-status, solidarity is that immigration officials can reliably 
conclude that because these migrants have been willing and able 
to form meaningful social bonds with US workers once already, 
they are likely to do so with other US workers moving forward. 
It is harder to reach the same conclusion regarding migrants 
who have stood with other migrants. Such acts of defiance cer-
tainly demonstrate a willingness to punish bad-actor employers. 
It becomes harder to infer that these workers necessarily have 
or are willing to form social bonds with native workers. This is 
not to say such workers should not be allowed to proceed with 
their claims against their bad-actor employers. They should. But 
a screening regime that takes solidarity seriously as a marker of 
membership potential would have to consider the composition of 
 
 131 See Sachs, 29 Cardozo L Rev at 2685–87 (cited in note 80). 
 132 Id at 2727 (“[S]hared experience of unjust treatment will increase the salience of 
the collective identity which is the basis for such treatment.”). 
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the community of interest in allocating immigration benefits. If 
the point of screening for solidarity is to use the workplace as a 
laboratory for integration (rather than as a site for implement-
ing a strategy of deterrence), this is a crucial step.  
B.  Should Screening Duties Be Delegated? 
Another design question relates to delegation. The delega-
tion and devolution of power to local entities has been justified 
by the desire to expand the executive’s reach in screening for 
“serious criminal aliens.”133 The executive might similarly  
expand its screening powers in this context. The current model 
of screening focuses on those migrants who report or seek to 
remedy labor violations. But one option would be to expand the 
number of triggers that slow the removal process. For example, 
the 2011 MOU disrupts the removal of immigrants only where a 
particular workplace is subject to DOL investigation.134 As a re-
sult, the executive’s screening capacity is constrained by DOL’s 
resources because the agency simply cannot respond to, much 
less investigate, every complaint that is filed. But partnering 
with state labor investigations can have a force-multiplier ef-
fect,135 thus expanding the executive’s ability to screen for mi-
grants engaging in acts of solidarity. Indeed, some scholarship 
suggests that state and local labor agencies have been more suc-
cessful than their federal counterparts in protecting the work-
place-related rights of unauthorized migrants.136 
While the delegation of authority to state labor agencies 
would expand the reach of a solidarity-based screening regime, 
such a move would encounter at least two difficulties. First, as 
in the “crimmigration” context, regulators will confront princi-
pal-agent problems. For example, our nation’s labor laws permit 
states to create local versions of the federal Occupational Safety 
 
 133 Morton, Memorandum, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities at 1-3 (cited in 
note 48).  
 134 Revised Memorandum of Understanding at *2 (cited in note 19) (“ICE agrees to 
refrain from engaging in civil worksite enforcement activities at a worksite that is the 
subject of an existing DOL investigation of a labor dispute.”). 
 135 See Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Regime Part I: A New Vision for Workplace Regulation, 33 NYU Rev L & Soc 
Change 479, 547–50 (2009) (arguing in favor of greater coordination between federal and 
state labor enforcement agencies). 
 136 See, for example, Gleeson, 35 L & Soc Inq at 562 (cited in note 10); Shannon 
Gleeson, Organizing for Immigrant Labor Rights: Latino Immigrants in San Jose and 
Houston, in S. Karthick Ramakrishnan and Irene Bloemraad, eds, Civic Hopes and Polit-
ical Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations, and Political Engagement 107, 
119 (Russell Sage 2008). 
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and Health Act of 1970137 plans.138 Although these plans are sub-
ject to federal approval, once these plans are approved, it is dif-
ficult for federal labor agencies to continue monitoring their lo-
cal counterparts, thus creating the distinct possibility that local 
labor enforcement will deviate from federal priorities and stand-
ards.139 One of the advantages of consolidating screening power 
in the hands of DHS and DOL officials is that power remains 
centralized.140 
A second hurdle will be that delegating screening power 
may actually neutralize the very trait that enables state labor 
agencies to protect the rights of unauthorized migrants in the 
first place. Whenever state labor agencies interact with workers, 
engage stakeholders, or provide information to the community 
more generally, they can credibly promise that an informational 
firewall separates them from federal entities.141 But this credibil-
ity will strain under the weight of misperceptions that would in-
evitably arise if state and local labor enforcement agencies begin 
acting on the basis of delegated power. And while the vast ma-
jority of information that is shared with DOL (which is itself 
bound by an informational firewall) will not be shared with 
DHS, immigrant communities often suffer from imperfect infor-
mation about what legal obligations state and local labor agen-
cies do and do not have to carry out.142 
C.  When Should Workers Be Screened? 
A final design question is a more fundamental one. Sorting 
other removable migrants in the removal pipeline operates at 
the back end, often well after a noncitizen has effectuated an 
unauthorized entry or overstayed the terms of her visa. As oth-
ers have pointed out, the benefits of ex post screening can be 
measured in terms of information acquisition—immigration offi-
cials can simply learn more about potential members in this 
 
 137 Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590, codified as amended at 29 USC § 651 et seq. 
 138 29 USC § 667(b). 
 139 See Jayesh M. Rathod, Protecting Immigrant Workers through Interagency Coop-
eration, 53 Ariz L Rev 1157, 1161–62 (2011). 
 140 Ensuring that low-level agency officials carry out the executive’s bidding pre-
sents its own challenges. As I have explored elsewhere, an agency’s mission orientation, 
organizational structure, and the number and nature of enforcement goals all affect 
whether and to what extent agency decision making reflects the will of the president and 
other high-ranking cabinet members. Lee, 53 Ariz L Rev at 1092–93 (cited in note 20). 
 141 See Gleeson, Organizing for Immigrant Labor Rights at 119 (cited in note 136). 
 142 See Lee, 53 Ariz L Rev at 1100–05 (cited in note 20).  
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manner.143 But such a system operates at a considerable cost to 
the migrants: because these immigration benefits are distribut-
ed largely as a matter of discretion, unauthorized migrants must 
organize their lives amidst a set of rules mired in uncertainty. 
Correcting this uncertainty requires Congress to redesign the 
labor migration process and to grant US workers or organiza-
tions representing their interests the power to assume greater 
formal control over the member-selection process at the front 
end. 
Ultimately, Congress retains a monopoly over the criteria 
that must be fulfilled in order to access full membership. Alt-
hough the executive can expand the channels through which U 
visa applicants may come to the attention of immigration offi-
cials, agency officials cannot grant applications to any more 
noncitizens than the annual visa limit permits.144 
The executive can distribute some benefits without congres-
sional oversight, but these benefits may be more easily extin-
guished. For example, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion of-
ten comes in the form of conferring deferred-action status to 
otherwise removable migrants.145 Such status can attach at vari-
ous stages of the removal process and carries different mean-
ings. It might mean that an agency official has decided not to in-
itiate removal proceedings, or it could mean that a migrant’s 
case has simply been deprioritized, which means that it might 
be taken from the bottom of the pile at any time. And as is the 
case with most exercises of enforcement discretion, deferred-
action status is largely unreviewable by a court.146 At the same 
time, the membership benefits in this context are thinner and 
less robust. Conferring deferred-action status upon a worker 
saves that worker from removal, but granting a migrant’s re-
quest for reprieve is not the same as inviting that migrant to be-
come a member. In a similar vein, DHS’s “silent raids” do not 
point the way toward membership, but neither do they set out to 
sweep unauthorized migrants into the removal pipeline.147 Alt-
hough such an approach permits these workers to “live to work 
another day” and could be understood as a way to preserve the 
opportunity for membership benefits in the future, the predicta-
 
 143 Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 847–49 (cited in note 45).  
 144 See INA § 214(p)(2)(A), 8 USC § 1184(p)(2)(A). 
 145 See, for example, Wan Chung Wen v Ferro, 543 F Supp 1016, 1017 (WDNY 1982). 
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ble consequence of this approach is to push migrants into a 
sweatshop or other workplace operating within the informal 
economy. 
Without any real guarantees of obtaining U visa certifica-
tion or a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, unauthor-
ized migrants must weigh whether the potential benefits of ob-
taining membership benefits (in whatever form) are worth the 
dangers of outing themselves to immigration enforcement offi-
cials. The Obama administration has refined the removal pro-
cess to allow unauthorized workers to press their equitable 
claims, but at a certain point, no amount of refining can make 
up for what the current screening system lacks, namely clearly 
enforceable guidelines for beneficiaries.148  
A strong case could be made for screening migrants at the 
front end through a formal (and congressional rather than exec-
utive) redesign of the labor migration system. The redesign 
would give labor organizations formal sponsorship authority, 
which is currently monopolized by employers. This is precisely 
the kind of reform for which Professor Gordon has creatively and 
persuasively advocated.149 Under Professor Gordon’s model, 
these organizations would operate in a transnational context, 
which 
would entitle migrants to services, benefits, and rights that 
cross borders just as the workers do. In exchange for the au-
thorization to work that they would receive as members, 
migrant workers would commit to the core value of labor cit-
izenship: solidarity with other workers in the United States, 
 
 148 The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program provides one exam-
ple of how the executive can distribute immigration benefits with some measure of clari-
ty and without congressional input. In a memorandum issued by DHS, Secretary Janet 
Napolitano provides a clear set of criteria defining who may qualify for deferred action 
relief. See Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, Memorandum for David V. 
Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, US Customs and Border Protection, Alejandro Mayorkas, 
Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, John Morton, Director, ICE, Exercis-
ing Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States 
as Children 1 (June 15, 2012), online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising 
-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (visited Mar 4, 
2012). Given the controversial nature of this program, it is unlikely the executive could 
provide relief through similar channels to unauthorized workers asserting labor claims 
or to classes of migrants other than those inviting sympathies comparable to the high-
achieving youth who benefitted under DACA. For criticisms of this program, see Robert 
J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, The Obama Administration, the DREAM Act and the 
Take Care Clause, 91 Tex L Rev *7–41 (forthcoming 2013), online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144031 (visited Mar 4, 2013); Arizona 
v United States, 132 S Ct 2492, 2521–22 (2012) (Scalia dissenting).  
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expressed as a commitment to refuse to work under condi-
tions that violate the law or labor agreements.150  
Transferring formal screening duties to labor organizations, 
Professor Gordon argues, will help resolve the tension that US 
workers face in seeking to build ties with unauthorized workers 
(which improves working conditions) while controlling the flow 
of future unauthorized migration (which undermines such 
conditions).151 
The benefit of formalizing and moving up the screening pro-
cess is that it makes the entire process more transparent. It al-
lows future migrants (mostly from Latin America) to make bet-
ter choices about whether they want to undertake the risky 
journey north. Rather than entering the United States “outside 
of the law”152 and hoping that solidarity opportunities arise so 
they can prove themselves, migrant workers can commit at the 
front end, offer an “oath of solidarity,”153 and enter the United 
States with a clear picture of the conditions under which admis-
sion will be revoked.  
Of course, an oath of solidarity places a lot of faith in a mi-
grant’s word. In trading information-acquisition (which benefits 
the state) for certainty (which by-and-large benefits the mi-
grant), Professor Gordon’s model invites the possibility of mi-
grants shirking on their solidarity commitments once they gain 
entry in part because it short-circuits the organic and informal 
process by which intimacy and solidarity opportunities often 
arise. One way to reconcile these competing concerns would be 
to impose some set of continuing obligations on the immigrants 
once they enter the United States. As a part of their oath of soli-
darity, workers admitted in this manner would agree that a 
failure to make good on a solidarity oath triggers the possibility 
of removal.154  
Injecting the possibility of removal raises another risk: the 
possibility of subjecting workers to exploitation at the hands of 
US workers (and the organizations that represent them) rather 
than US employers. To control for this, the migration rules could 
be calibrated so that the solidarity oath (and its concomitant 
removal provision) would last for a relatively short period of 
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time. Other migration rules employ a similar type of probation-
ary period. Since 1986, Congress has subjected admission on the 
basis of a marriage to a US citizen to a two-year conditional sta-
tus. This conditional status can be removed only by petition at 
the two-year mark155 and is designed to deter the use of sham 
marriages to obtain membership benefits.156 This is precisely the 
dynamic implicated by screening for solidarity at the front end. 
Thus, the immigration code might sensibly extend its regulation 
of intimacy from the home into the workplace should Congress 
vest labor organizations with sponsorship power. 
CONCLUSION 
Regulating the workplace has long posed a vexing challenge 
for immigration officials. But once we account for enforcement 
realities, the challenge becomes more manageable, and it even 
begins bearing the markers of rationality. Labor law is more 
than a tool to be used to guard against exploitative employment 
practices. It can also facilitate the member-selection process and 
advance immigration law’s integrationist project by collecting 
useful and otherwise difficult to obtain information about mi-
grants and their commitments. 
 
 155 See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 § 2, Pub L No 99-639, 
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